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Should the Eighth Amendment prohibit all undeserved criminal convictions and
punishments? There are grounds to argue that it must. Correlation between the level of
deserts of the accused and the severity of the sanction imposed represents the very idea
of justice to most of us. We want to believe that those branded as criminals deserve
blame for their conduct and that they deserve all of the punishment they receive. A de-
serts limitation is also key to explaining the decisions in which the Supreme Court has
rejected convictions or punishments as disproportional, including several major rulings
in the new millennium. Yet, this view of the Eighth Amendment challenges many cur-
rent criminal-law doctrines and sentencing practices that favor crime prevention over
retributive limits. Mistake-of-law doctrine, felony-murder rules, and mandatory-
minimum sentencing laws are only a few examples. Why have these laws and practices
survived? One answer is that the Supreme Court has limited proportionality relief to a
few narrow problems involving the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole,
and it has avoided openly endorsing the deserts limitation even in cases in which defen-
dants have prevailed. This Article presents a deeper explanation. I point to four reasons
why the doctrine must remain severely stunted in relation to its animating principle.
I aim to clarify both what the Eighth Amendment reveals about the kind of people
we would like to be and why the Supreme Court is not able to force us to live up to
that aspiration.
INTRODUCTION
Few knowledgeable persons would deny that our system of criminal justice some-
times fails to ensure fair outcomes for criminal defendants.1 But the harder acknowledg-
ment is that tendencies toward unfair treatment of defendants are built-in to the system.
Some constitutional doctrines, such as the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt2 and the protection against self-incrimination,3 go far towards protecting accused
* Frank L. Williams Professor of Criminal Law, Dale E. Fowler School of Law,
Chapman University.
1 See generally, e.g., KERRY MAX COOK, CHASING JUSTICE: MY STORY OF FREEING
MYSELF AFTER TWO DECADES ON DEATH ROW FOR A CRIME I DIDN’T COMMIT (2007)
(describing an effort to clear one’s name after wrongful prosecution).
2 See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (holding that a federal habeas corpus
court must consider “whether there was sufficient evidence . . . to find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
an essential of due process and fair treatment of a juvenile or an adult).
3 See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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persons. They even help some guilty defendants evade conviction.4 Many other defen-
dants also avoid deserved punishment through plea bargaining.5 Nonetheless, some
criminal defendants receive far more punishment than they deserve.6
Numerous criminal-law doctrines and sentencing laws and practices favor crime
prevention over retributive limits. Examples on the liability front include felony-murder
doctrine,7 juvenile transfer rules,8 and statutes abolishing or neutering the insanity
defense.9 Examples on the sentencing front include mandatory-minimum sentences,10
“three-strike” laws,11 and the practice of imposing much lengthier sentences on repeat
offenders who have paid fully for their prior crimes.12 By discounting offender deserts,
these laws and practices produce injustice by design.
The prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” in the Eighth Amendment13
provides hope for remedying some of these injustices. The potential for Eighth
4 Long before the promulgation of our Constitution, Blackstone asserted that we should give
the margin of advantage to the criminal defendant: “[T]he law holds that it is better that ten guilty
persons escape than that one innocent suffer.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND *358, 2546 (William Carey Jones ed., 1916).
5 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV.
652, 660 & n.17 (1981); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L. J.
1979, 1988, 2009 (1992).
6 See Schulhofer, supra note 5, at 1981–82.
7 See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 510–24 (6th ed. 2012)
(explaining that the felony-murder doctrine is intended to prevent accidental killings during the
commission of a felony).
8 See David O. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: How
(Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2004) (“[T]he trend to
try juveniles as adults mistakenly assesses the punishment juveniles deserve by the wrong or
harm they have done, ignoring their diminished responsibility for this wrong or harm.”).
9 See, e.g., Delling v. Idaho, 133 S. Ct. 504, 504 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that
four states have abolished or severely limited the insanity defense); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d
359, 385–87 (Utah 1995) (Stewart, Assoc. C.J., dissenting) (contending that the evisceration of
the insanity defense in Utah violates the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and that
“[i]mposing retribution on insane persons is nothing more than a blind, atavistic vengeance.”);
see also infra note 326.
10 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.06 cmt. at 6 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011)
(“Empirical research and policy analyses have shown time and again that mandatory-minimum
penalties . . . lead to disproportionate and even bizarre sanctions in individual cases . . . .”).
11 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
453, 493 (1997) (contending that such laws make little sense from a deontological de-
serts perspective).
12 See DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 55 (asserting that, in such a case, “a retributivist cannot jus-
tify punishing the offender more for the present offense merely because of the prior wrongs”);
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 466 (1978) (“The contemporary pressure
to consider prior convictions in setting the level of . . . punishment reflects a theory of social pro-
tection rather than a theory of deserved punishment.”).
13 The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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Amendment relief arises because the Supreme Court has declared that the clause pro-
hibits not merely certain egregious punishments that are always improper, but also
those that are disproportional as applied although not always proscribed.14 The explana-
tion behind a proportionality mandate focuses on retributive theory and asserts that
there is injustice in inflicting punishment that exceeds retributive limits.15 Under this
view, laws and practices are unjust when they impose criminal liability or punishment
beyond what the defendant deserves, even if such imposition is plausibly aimed at
crime prevention or other utilitarian ends.16
The view that the Eighth Amendment limits excessive punishment17 has a long ped-
igree in Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Court first rejected a punishment on this
basis in 1910, in Weems v. United States,18 striking down a fifteen-year sentence of
harsh imprisonment and perpetual loss of civil liberties for minor crimes, without sug-
gesting that the sanctions would be impermissible for serious crimes, such as rape or
homicide.19 While the mandate of Weems20 lay largely dormant for more than half a
century,21 the Justices returned to it in the 1970s to begin limiting the use of the death
14 See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982).
15 See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A
Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 323, 344 (1992)  [hereinafter Howe,
Resolving the Conflict] (explaining an Eighth Amendment “excessiveness theory rooted purely
in retributive ideals”).
16 See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA.
L. REV. 677, 683 (2005) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment ban on excessive punishment should be
understood as a constitutional norm adapted from the retributivist principle that the harshness
of punishment should not exceed the gravity of the crime—one should not be punished more
harshly than one deserves.”).
17 I use the terms “disproportionate” and “excessive” interchangeably in this Article. Some
observers might urge distinctions between them based on the opinions of the Court. For ex-
ample, one might contend that a punishment must be “grossly disproportionate” to qualify
as “excessive.” See infra note 228 and accompanying text. Likewise, one might contend that
decisions in which the Court has prohibited the execution of a person who has become insane
after his appeals have been denied suggest that a punishment can be excessive although not dis-
proportionate. See infra note 101. Because these kinds of distinctions are unimportant to my
themes, I do not distinguish between the terms.
18 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
19 See id. at 366–67 (“Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who have formed their
conception of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from the practice of the
American commonwealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to offense.”).
20 For more on the history and meaning of Weems, see Margaret Raymond, “No Fellow in
American Legislation”: Weems v. United States and the Doctrine of Proportionality, 30 VT. L.
REV. 251, 301 (2006).
21 The first case after Weems in which the Court reversed a sentence under the Eighth
Amendment where the justification, at least implicitly, was excessiveness rather than per se im-
propriety was Robinson v. California. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). There, the Court overturned a
conviction and ninety-day prison sentence for violation of a statute prohibiting one to “be
addicted to the use of narcotics.” Id. at 660–61 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
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penalty. A prohibition on excessiveness best explains the Court’s holding in Furman
v. Georgia22 and subsequent decisions requiring individualized sentencing consideration
as a prerequisite to the imposition of a death sentence.23 Likewise, the Court explicitly
relied on the Weems idea to strike down the death penalty for rape of an adult victim in
Coker v. Georgia24 and, a few years later, to exempt from the death sanction a few of-
fenders who fall within the fringes of the felony-murder rule,25 as well as some who
committed their crimes when under sixteen years of age.26 In the non-capital context,
the Court also used the excessiveness idea once in the early 1980s in Solem v. Helm27
to strike down a sentence of life imprisonment without parole imposed under a South
Dakota “recidivist statute.”28
After a subsequent period of generally rejecting or ignoring excessiveness claims,
the Court repeatedly endorsed the Weems idea in the new millennium. In the capital
punishment context, the Court thrice broadened proportionality protections, beginning
in 2002. In Atkins v. Virginia,29 the Court exempted mentally retarded offenders from
the death penalty.30 In Roper v. Simmons,31 juvenile offenders—defined as persons
under age eighteen—gained protection.32 Three years later, in Kennedy v. Louisiana,33
the Court excluded offenders convicted of child rape from death eligibility.34 In the con-
text of non-capital crimes, the Court also expanded protections afforded to juvenile
offenders. In 2010, in Graham v. Florida,35 the Court prohibited a sentence of life im-
prisonment without parole for any nonhomicide offense committed by a juvenile.36
did not cite Weems, but one could infer the excessiveness rationale. See Alice Ristroph, Propor-
tionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE. L.J. 263, 303 (2005).
In Powell v. Texas, the Court declined to extend Robinson to invalidate the conviction of a
purportedly chronic alcoholic under a Texas statute that provided: “Whoever shall get drunk or
be found in a state of intoxication in any public place, or at any private house except his own,
shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars.” 392 U.S. 514, 517 (1968) (citation omitted).
22 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
23 See Scott W. Howe, The Constitution and Capital Sentencing: Pursuing Justice and
Equality, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 749, 779–89 (1992) [hereinafter Howe, The Constitution].
24 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
25 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982).
26 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 n.4 (1988).
27 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
28 Id. Helm had been convicted of six previous crimes, but they were non-violent and rela-
tively minor, and his seventh conviction was merely for writing a bad check for $100. See id. at
279–81.
29 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
30 Id. at 304.
31 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
32 Id.
33 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
34 Id. at 2664.
35 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
36 Id. at 2034.
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Likewise, in 2012, in Miller v. Alabama37 and a companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs,38
the Court prohibited a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for any
offense, including murder, committed by a juvenile.
The recent non-capital decisions concerning juveniles are especially noteworthy be-
cause the Court announced categorical limits on sentences of imprisonment.39 In non-
capital cases, the Court previously had authorized, with one unusual exception,40 only
“‘narrow proportionality’ review” that focused on the propriety of the sentence imposed
on “the particular defendant” for the “particular crime at issue.”41 In Solem v. Helm,42
for example, the Court had only concluded that the South Dakota “recidivist statute,”
authorizing life imprisonment without parole, was invalid as applied to Helm, in light
of his background and his particular crime.43 The recent non-capital decisions marked
off categorical protections that directly affected hundreds of incarcerated juvenile of-
fenders and that will affect more in the future.44
The recent proportionality cases invite questions about the expansion of Eighth
Amendment doctrine in the next decade. For example, will the Court soon protect
young offenders from sentences of imprisonment that exceed some given number of
years? Will the Court impose similar protections for mentally retarded offenders or, at
least, hold that they cannot receive mandatory sentences of life imprisonment with-
out parole? Will the Court also protect a wider group by invalidating, for example,
mandatory-minimum sentencing laws and three-strike statutes or, at least, reject their
mandatory nature as applied to relatively low-culpability offenders? Some further ex-
pansion of proportionality doctrine seems plausible. Yet, the recent proportionality
rulings extending protection, like previous ones, are narrow.45 The Court’s opinions in
those cases also contain opaque tests of excessiveness along with ad hoc analysis and
discussion that seem designed to closely confine proportionality protections.46 The
safest observation surely is that the Court in the near future will, at most, expand safe-
guards in modest ways that are not easily predicted.
The larger question about the proportionality mandate, however, concerns not sim-
ply its short-run future, but also its development over a larger sweep of history: Why
37 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
38 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).
39 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine In: The
Supreme Court Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-Off Approaches to Eighth
Amendment Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79, 81–83 (2010).
40 The exception was Robinson v. California. See text accompanying note 21.
41 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
42 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
43 See id. at 296–97 (discussing the particular details of Helm’s crime and his prior offenses
as part of the analytical framework for concluding that his sentence was excessive).
44 See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Ethan Bronner, Mandatory Life Terms Barred for Juveniles in
Murder Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2012, at A1, A14 (noting that the Graham decision affected
“about 130 prisoners” and that the 2012 decisions affected “more than 2,000” inmates).
45 See infra text accompanying notes 232–42.
46 See infra text accompanying notes 232–42, 251–58.
96 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:91
has a constitutional concept that stems from a central aspiration of justice—that crimi-
nal defendants should receive no more punishment than they deserve—produced such
modest protection against injustice? Answering that question is the purpose of this
Article. My conclusion, in short, is that the Court must restrain its commitment to the
aspiration more than we generally wish to acknowledge.
I point to four reasons why proportionality doctrine, as articulated by the Court,
must remain anemic compared to its theoretical potential. First, determining appropriate
retributive limits and how they should restrain various criminal laws and term-of-year
sentences is tremendously complex,47 and the answers can change over time. The Court
possesses neither the resources nor the wisdom necessary to decide all of the cases that
it should take on and resolve to guide such a complicated, ongoing effort.
Second, the Court’s promulgation of an extensive code of proportionality lim-
its would thwart appropriate change by legislatures and sentencing bodies. Judg-
ments about desert limits do not arise in a vacuum, but rather from societal norms and
values.48 Moreover, appropriate changes in societal assessments of the limits of de-
served punishment can move in two directions—toward greater leniency or toward
greater severity. When the Court grants proportionality protection, it may deter appro-
priate change in the direction of severity. This deterrent effect can also continue long
into the future.
Third, widespread invalidation of disproportional sentences might undermine legiti-
mate crime-prevention efforts. This result could follow if there were downward pressure
on the already discounted sentences achieved through plea bargaining.49 Because most
criminal cases find resolution through bargained guilty pleas,50 downward influences
on those sentences would affect the overall sentencing distribution even among the
many cases where no valid claim of excessiveness currently exists.
Finally, using the deserts-limitation principle to invalidate a wide array of criminal
laws that aim for crime prevention at the expense of honoring retributive limits would
put the Court far ahead of most citizens in honoring justice for defendants over self-
interest.51 Although society cares about justice for the accused, it also cares about crime
prevention. Our criminal laws and sentencing practices reflect this conflict in our per-
sonal perspectives.52 Although we endorse the principle of ensuring that defendants
only receive punishment that they deserve, we prefer to ignore it when we perceive a
serious risk to our safety.53 Indeed, we ignore the ideal on a stunningly regular basis.54
47 The proposition that proportionality determinations in categorical cases ultimately
depend on the Court’s “own judgment” is a recurring theme in the Court’s decisions. See,
e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (asserting importance of the Court’s
“independent judgment”); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788–89 (1982).
48 See infra notes 278–81 and accompanying text.
49 See infra Part III.C.
50 See infra notes 295–96 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 84–91, 311–13 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 84–91, 311–13 and accompanying text.
53 See infra text accompanying note 311.
54 See infra notes 311–28 and accompanying text.
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In these circumstances, as Alexander Bickel famously contended, the Justices should
exercise prudence in trying to force compliance with the “moral principle.”55 The Court
does best to avoid the “tyrannical tendency” of insisting on rigid adherence to an ideal
that ignores the citizenry’s perception of existing necessities.56
My project to rationalize the Court’s tepid proportionality jurisprudence proceeds
in three stages. Part I explains the aspiration for justice embodied in a proportionality
mandate. I show that common notions of justice accord with a deserts limitation—the
proposition that persons should not receive more punishment than they deserve. I also
demonstrate that the only principle derived from penological theory that can explain the
Court’s decisions granting proportionality protection is the deserts limitation.
Despite the intuitive appeal and explanatory power of the deserts limitation, Part II
demonstrates that the Court has not embraced it or even consistently endorsed it. The
Court has rejected proportionality claims where the challenged punishment appeared
undeserved.57 The Court also has often obscured that the idea of disproportionality is
about whether the defendant received more punishment than he deserves. Even as
it has granted proportionality relief in the recent cases, the Court has continued to
articulate measures of disproportionality that de-emphasize the role of retributive
theory.58 The Court’s opinions suggest a desire by the Justices to avoid the logic of the
deserts limitation.
Part III discusses the four reasons that the Court should avoid fully pursuing the
deserts limitation and the slippery slope that comes with endorsing it. I begin with the
complexity of the Court’s effort to determine and articulate a code of proportionality
limits. I then discuss the problematic one-way ratchet effect of a grant of proportionality
protection. Discussion then focuses on the negative impact that the Court’s close regu-
lation of criminal sentences could have on the already discounted sentences imposed
through plea bargaining. Part III ends by discussing the risk to the Court’s continuing
influence if it were to try to invalidate and then regulate on proportionality grounds a
wide array of current laws and sentencing practices that the citizenry perceives as serv-
ing crime prevention.
I conclude that proportionality doctrine under the Eighth Amendment must remain
severely stunted in relation to its animating ideal. A messy struggle between principle
and pragmatism will prevail. The Court will grant relief on a few claims of excessive-
ness, but it will generally try “to avoid a clash with popular opinion and the majoritarian
branches of government.”59 In the process, the Court will continue to provide rationales
for granting proportionality relief that appear inconsistent and ad hoc.60 Understanding
55 See Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567,
1581, 1585 (1985).
56 See id. at 1570; see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 12 (1975).
57 See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (upholding a forty-year sentence for pos-
sessing with intent to distribute and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana).
58 See infra Part II.B.
59 Kronman, supra note 55, at 1585.
60 See infra Part II.A.
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the Court’s work requires acknowledging that, among other obstacles to principled
decisionmaking about proportionality, the Court cannot enforce an ideal that diverges
too greatly from consent61 and that we are more resistant to following our aspirations
when there is a price to pay than we generally wish to portray ourselves.
I. EXCESS PUNISHMENT AS UNDESERVED PUNISHMENT
In this Part, I contend that the core explanation for the Weems concept of excessive-
ness62 is simply the injustice of imposing more punishment on a criminal offender than
he deserves. A desert limitation conforms with widely accepted notions of justice. A
deserts limitation is also the only penological principle that can explain the Court’s de-
cisions granting proportionality protection.63 These sources teach that punishment be-
comes disproportional because retribution carries its own limits, and those limits exist
apart from whether punishment might serve other ends.
A. Penological Theories, Justice, and the Eighth Amendment
Controversy has long existed over the penological theory or theories that justify
the state in punishing crime,64 but this controversy does not prevent the conclusion that
the limits on appropriate punishment are retributive. The principal consequentialist rea-
sons typically offered to justify criminal sanctions include general deterrence, incapaci-
tation, and rehabilitation.65 Retribution, “defined simply as the application of the pains
of punishment to an offender who is morally guilty,”66 expresses the competing deon-
tological justification. However, as H. L. A. Hart explained, the “General Justifying
Aim” of criminal punishment warrants separate consideration from any “principles of
Distribution,” and “it is perfectly consistent to assert both that the General Justifying
61 An example of what happens when the Court violates this prudential philosophy is the
aftermath of Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). See Carol S. Steiker, Furman
v. Georgia: Not an End, But a Beginning, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES 95, 105 (John H.
Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009) (“[T]he Furman decision itself and the continuing
constitutional regulation . . . it engendered may well have helped to shore up the beleaguered
practice of capital punishment—a conclusion that represents an ironic and cautionary twist to
the familiar, triumphant story of a ‘landmark victory’ in the Supreme Court.”).
62 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381–82 (1910).
63 H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 9 (2d ed. 1968); see infra notes 146–58
and accompanying text.
64 See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 19–23.
65 See id. at 15.
66 See HART, supra note 63; see also Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179,
180–81 (Ferdinand Schoenman ed., 1987) (defining retributivism as the “view that punishment
is justified by the moral culpability of those who receive it”); John Rawls, Two Concepts of
Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955) (“What we may call the retributive view is that punishment
is justified on the grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment.”).
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Aim of the practice of punishment is its beneficial consequences and that the pursuit
of this General Aim should be qualified or restricted out of deference to principles of
Distribution . . . .”67 Thus, whether or not retribution should win out over consequen-
tialist claims as the general justifying aim, we are not foreclosed from concluding that
it should win out on questions of distribution.68
To support a restriction on criminal punishment, retribution also need only win out
in a limited way on the problem of distribution. The idea of retribution contemplates
that an offender deserves punishment for wrongdoing.69 The view that a person should
not receive more punishment than he deserves—the deserts limitation—can be under-
stood as part of this larger idea.70 Immanuel Kant concluded that justice demands that
we always pursue not only the deserts limitation, but also a larger notion.71 He asserted
that injustice exists to an intolerable degree both when a person receives more pun-
ishment than she deserves and when she receives less.72 Yet, we could hold a less
rigid view. We could concede the propriety of reducing punishment on consequential
grounds even when an offender deserves something more severe.73 This concession
need not stop us from believing that there is intolerable injustice in punishing a person
more than she deserves.74 After all, the Eighth Amendment does not mandate that of-
fenders receive all of the punishment that they deserve.75 The Court has concluded that
the Amendment prohibits excess.76
Excess punishment understood as injustice is inherently a retributive idea.77 One
can imagine proportionality systems that build on utilitarian theories, and some thinkers
67 HART, supra note 63, at 9.
68 Professor Hart noted, however, that if retribution is the general justification of criminal
punishment, retribution must win out on questions of distribution. See id. (“Retribution in
General Aim entails retribution in Distribution.”).
69 See, e.g., NIGEL WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER AND STIGMA: THE MORALITY OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 38–40 (1980).
70 See Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital Sentencing,
81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1012–13 (1996).
71 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHTS 195–96 (W. Hastie trans., Edinburgh,
T&T Clark 1887) (suggesting a criminal be found both guilty and punishable before measuring
the value of his punishment to the public).
72 See id. (“The Penal Law is a Categorical Imperative; and woe to him who creeps through
the serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from
the Justice of Punishment, or even from the due measure of it . . . .”).
73 See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Lifting the Veil on Punishment, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 443,
450 (2004).
74 See id.
75 See Howe, Resolving the Conflict, supra note 15, at 360.
76 See Howe, The Constitution, supra note 23, at 786–88.
77 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J.) (“Proportionality is inherently a retributive concept . . . .”).
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have advocated for them.78 Yet, those systems need no close connection with justice for
the individual. For example, instrumental considerations could sometimes justify the
death penalty for an innocent person, but those who would see justice on such grounds
in the state execution of an innocent person surely fall in a small and largely ignored
minority.79 Consequentialists might propose a “hybrid” system,80 in which punishment
requires a guilty person but then allows questions of how much punishment to impose
to depend purely on instrumental considerations. Yet instrumental considerations could
justify the death penalty for a minor offender if they could justify it for the wholly inno-
cent person. Few commentators have stepped forward to defend such undeserved pun-
ishment as just.81 For the state to impose more punishment than the offender deserves
on instrumental grounds is to sacrifice the individual as insignificant.82 Once instru-
mental considerations enter the calculus, proportionality may not maintain a close cor-
relation with our sense of fairness to the defendant.83
Criminal law and punishment scholars generally agree that most citizens accept the
desert limitation as consistent with justice.84 Whether our criminal and sentencing laws
actually accord with the desert limitation, citizens prefer to believe that they do.85 We
78 See generally, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION (London, T. Payne & Son 1789) (discussing the “principle of utility”).
79 For a hypothetical demonstrating that utilitarianism can justify serious punishment of a
person known to be innocent, see DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 19–20. See also Ian P. Farrell,
Gilbert & Sullivan and Scalia: Philosophy, Proportionality, and the Eighth Amendment, 55
VILL. L. REV. 321, 350 (2010) (discussing “vicarious punishment of an offender’s friends or
family members”).
80 Marc O. DeGirolami, Against Theories of Punishment: The Thought of Sir James
Fitzjames Stephen, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 699, 705 (2012).
81 Holmes argued for a utilitarian approach to criminal law, but he did not claim that it was
just for the individual. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 46–48 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1881). For more on Holmes’s view, see infra text accompanying notes
351–56.
82 Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 777, 781 (1985) (“Conviction and punishment are justified only if the defendant deserves
them.”); see also Richard W. Burgh, Do the Guilty Deserve Punishment?, 79 J. PHIL. 193, 197
(1982) (“[T]o render punishment compatible with justice, it is not enough that we restrict punish-
ment to the deserving, but we must, in addition, restrict the degree of punishment to the degree
that is deserved.”).
83 See Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as
Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1105 (2011) (“[T]o increase any of these instrumental
effects [—deterrence incapacitation of the dangerous, and rehabilitation—] the distribution of
criminal liability and punishment must deviate from desert, that is, it must do injustice or must
fail to do justice.”).
84 See, e.g., id. (“Laypersons see punishment as something that is properly imposed according
to desert, that is, blameworthiness.”).
85 See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, A Truly (and Peculiarly) American “Revolution in Punish-
ment Theory,” 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1113, 1116 (2011) (noting that, in discussing criminal law doc-
trines such as three strikes, high drug offense penalties, and adult prosecution of juveniles, “I
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want to conclude that those branded as criminals deserve blame for their conduct and,
further, that they merit the punishment that they receive.86 If we ask average citizens
why it is just for the state to punish a murderer with a long prison term, they are “likely
to say that he ‘deserves’ it.”87 Likewise, if we ask them why it is unjust for the state to
punish a petty thief with the same punishment as a murderer, they are likely to say “this
offender [does] not ‘deserve’ to be punished so severely.”88 I suggest that citizens are
willing to sacrifice justice in a quest for crime deterrence, but I also suggest that, in ad-
vocating instrumental goals, they do not like to focus on the unfairness to the defendant.
Surveys tend to reveal that, when asked about the purpose of prison, citizens most often
cite instrumental goals.89 However, when asked about appropriate punishment in spe-
cific cases, they recognize offender deserts as the measure of justice.90 Correlation be-
tween the level of deserts of the offender and the severity of the sanction represents the
very idea of justice for persons on the street.91
The structure and history of the Eighth Amendment also suggests that retributive
limits, undiluted by consequentialist factors, define excess punishment. The Amend-
ment contains clauses that expressly prohibit “excessive” bail and “excessive” fines.92
This readily suggests that the clause against “cruel and unusual” punishment can
prohibit not only certain modes of punishment, but also those that are excessive.93
Moreover, as Chief Justice Burger recounted in his dissent in Furman v. Georgia, the
often hear justifications . . . in terms that expressly sound, at least to me, to be lay assertions of
moral blameworthiness.”).
86 See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1621 (1992) (“[W]e want to
believe that those we convict and punish deserve what we are doing to them . . . [because we]
share the retributivist’s intuition that equates justice to the individual with some showing of the
offender’s moral desert.”).
87 See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 45 (1976).
88 RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 12 (3d ed. 2010).
89 See BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, OPTIMISM, PESSIMISM, AND JAILHOUSE
REDEMPTION: AMERICAN ATTITUDES ON CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND OVER-INCARCERATION
3 (2001) (noting responses to question regarding the main purpose of prison: “To punish
(21%) . . . to rehabilitate (40%) . . . to protect society (21%) . . . to deter others (12%).”).
90 See, e.g., John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for
Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 659 (2000), available at http://psycnet.apa.org
/journals/lhb/24/6/659.html (finding that, in specifying appropriate punishments for convicted
defendants in hypothetical crime scenarios, subjects rely on desert considerations).
91 See, e.g., John Hospers, Retribution: The Ethics of Punishment, in ASSESSING THE
CRIMINAL 181, 183 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hegel, III eds., 1977) (“‘[T]reatment in accord
with desert’ is probably the most frequently encountered definition of the term ‘justice’ itself.”).
92 See supra note 13; see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998) (“[F]or-
feiture of the entire $357,144 that respondent failed to declare [when carrying it in cash on a
flight out of the country] would violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”).
93 See BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 185–86 (Boston, Marsh,
Capen & Lyon 1832) (“[S]hall it be supposed, that the power to fine is restrained, but the power
to imprison is wholly unrestricted by it?”).
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“dominant theme” of the debates over passage of the Amendment “was that the ends
of the criminal laws cannot justify the use of measures of extreme cruelty to achieve
them.”94 Thus, a particular punishment—such as “boiling people in oil”95—may be
thought more effective than less torturous punishments in deterring particular crimes.96
However, the Eighth Amendment proscribes that punishment because it is inhumane.
The same can be true, then, of a punishment that exceeds offender deserts, even if
it serves instrumental goals. The very purpose of the clause is to stop us from using
punishments in some instances, even when we legitimately believe they will achieve
valuable ends. As Youngjae Lee has noted, the Eighth Amendment “serves as a side
constraint on the socially desirable practice of punishment.”97
B. Supreme Court Decisions Finding Excessiveness
Supreme Court decisions granting proportionality protections confirm that the
penological explanation comes from retributive theory.98 The Court often has avoided
clarifying this explanation. We will later see, for example, that the Court has begun to
define disproportionality according to an amalgam of penological considerations, in-
cluding crime prevention, thus denying the singular role of retributive limits.99 How-
ever, the only principle that can explain the Court’s decisions granting proportionality
protection is a deserts limitation.
1. Capital Cases
In the capital context, the Court has imposed both substantive and procedural regu-
lations under the Eighth Amendment.100 On the substantive side, the Court has prohib-
ited the death penalty on proportionality grounds in five circumstances101:
94 408 U.S. 238, 392 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
95 Herbert L. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071,
1076 (1964).
96 Id.
97 Lee, supra note 16, at 704.
98 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); see also infra text accompanying
notes 157–58.
99 See infra Part II.B.
100 See Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the Capital-
Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 829–35 (1998) [hereinafter Howe, The Failed Case].
101 I do not include in this list the Court’s decisions prohibiting the execution of a duly con-
victed and death-sentenced inmate while that person is insane. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551
U.S. 930 (2007); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). As Dan Markel has noted, a rationale
that may explain Panetti and Ford—a “communicative conception of retribution”—seems inher-
ently inconsistent with the death penalty. See Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and
the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1167 (2009). Consequently, one
might conclude that the explanatory rationale instead focuses on some other sense of inhumanity
associated with executing the currently insane. In any event, the “communicative conception of
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• In 1977, in Coker v. Georgia,102 for the rape of an adult victim not involv-
ing the taking of human life.103
• In 1982, in Enmund v. Florida,104 against a felony murderer who did not
intend to kill or actually kill, unless, as the Court later made clear in Tison
v. Arizona,105 he was a major participant in the felony and displayed reck-
less indifference to human life.
• In 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia,106 against a mentally retarded offender.107
• In 2005, in Roper v. Simmons,108 against an offender who was under
age eighteen.109
• In 2008, in Kennedy v. Louisiana,110 for the rape of child victim not in-
volving the taking of human life.111
The decisions prohibiting the death penalty for rape also imply—and have been in-
terpreted to mean—that the sanction violates the Eighth Amendment for almost all
offenses not involving the taking of human life.112
These substantive prohibitions on the capital sanction find explanation in a deserts
limitation. They cannot rest on the idea that the death penalty in these cases fails to
serve instrumental ends. First, general deterrence theory would still apply in these cases.
Rape or child rape is often a calculated crime113 that the death penalty would plausibly
deter more than life imprisonment, unless the death penalty never marginally deters any
retribution” arguably calls for “a commitment to punishing only those who are both guilty and
presently competent, with punishments that are not excessive to the defendant’s crime and cul-
pability.” Id. at 1167, 1221. That view of the explanation for Panetti and Ford also coincides
with my theme that retributivism “supervenes . . . other penal purposes” as the explanation for
proportionality limits. See id. at 1221.
102 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
103 Id.
104 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
105 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
106 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
107 Id.
108 543 U.S. 551 (2005); cf. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (prohibiting the
death penalty against those who offended when under sixteen years of age where the relevant
capital-punishment statute specified no minimum age).
109 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
110 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
111 Id.
112 Although the parameters are not clear, the death penalty may still survive for certain egre-
gious nonhomicide crimes that are committed not primarily against individuals but against the
state. See id. at 2659 (leaving open the question whether the death penalty might still properly
apply to “crimes defining and punishing treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin activity,
which are offenses against the State”).
113 RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, Acquaintance Rape, http://www.rainn.org/get
-information/types-of-sexual-assault/acquaintance-rape (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (describing
the planned steps an abuser will take to disarm his victim prior to an attack).
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crime.114 Other nonhomicide crimes, such as kidnapping, robbery, or burglary seem-
ingly would be marginally deterred by the death penalty for the same reason. Even for
mentally retarded or juvenile offenders, the death penalty could have some deterrent
effect on other mentally retarded or young persons contemplating violence,115 and
executing mentally retarded or young offenders could have a potent deterrent effect
on potential offenders who are neither mentally retarded nor young.116 The same
could be said for those on the fringes of the felony-murder doctrine, although with
less confidence.117
Second, incapacitation benefits would arise from executions in these cases. Execut-
ing a rapist or a murderer, including one who is mentally retarded or young, will pre-
vent that offender from harming another person in prison. Execution will also foreclose
escape by the offender and his re-offense outside of prison, and we should not forget
that Coker, the offender in the previously mentioned rape case,118 committed his crime
while on escape after having earlier been convicted for two separate rapes, one involv-
ing a victim that he mercilessly beat and left for dead and the other a victim that he mur-
dered.119 Because the death penalty in these cases serves instrumental ends, the better
explanation for its prohibition is that the offenders in these categories, while highly
114 See, e.g., Packer, supra note 95, at 1079.
115 See Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There a “Rational Understanding” of the
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285, 292 (2007);
see also Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 667, 671 (2000) (footnote omitted) (“[E]xecutions of people with mental ill-
ness are as likely to deter as any other type of execution.”).
116 See HART, supra note 63, at 19.
117 See HOLMES, supra note 81, at 56–58. But see DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 512 (noting that
homicides during independent felonies, such as robbery, are rare).
118 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
119 Chief Justice Burger described the situation in his dissent:
On December 5, 1971, the petitioner, Ehrlich Anthony Coker, raped and
then stabbed to death a young woman. Less than eight months later Coker
kidnaped and raped a second young woman. After twice raping this 16-
year-old victim, he stripped her, severely beat her with a club, and
dragged her into a wooded area where he left her for dead. He was appre-
hended and pleaded guilty to offenses stemming from these incidents. He
was sentenced by three separate courts to three life terms, two 20-year
terms, and one 8-year term of imprisonment. Each judgment specified that
the sentences it imposed were to run consecutively rather than concur-
rently. Approximately 1½ years later, on September 2, 1974, petitioner
escaped from the state prison where he was serving these sentences. He
promptly raped another 16-year-old woman in the presence of her hus-
band, abducted her from her home, and threatened her with death and
serious bodily harm. It is this crime for which the sentence now under
review was imposed.
Id. at 605 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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culpable, are generally not culpable enough to deserve the same sanction as aggra-
vated murderers.120
Various criminal-law and death-penalty scholars who have written on the subject
agree that the true explanation for these substantive prohibitions, although the Court has
not clarified it, comes from retributive theory. Joshua Dressler noted the retributive
basis for the prohibition against the death penalty for rape in Coker.121 Carol Steiker
has noted that the best understanding of the Court’s decisions protecting mentally
retarded and juvenile offenders “is that retribution alone is a necessary limit on the con-
stitutional use of capital punishment.”122 Pamela Wilkins has concluded that the prohi-
bition regarding child rapists is best explained based on retributive theory123 and that,
despite the Court’s failure to acknowledge the point, the broader line of capital propor-
tionality cases rest on a “deserts-limitation model.”124 Other scholars who have written
on the subject also have pointed to retributive theory as the best explanation for
these decisions.125
The procedural side of Eighth Amendment regulation of capital sentencing also
finds explanation in retributive theory. The Court’s holding in Furman v. Georgia126
and subsequent decisions requiring individualized sentencing consideration as a pre-
requisite to the imposition of the death penalty are ultimately explained as an effort to
protect against undeserved death sentences.127 In Lockett v. Ohio,128 the Court mandated
120 See Steiker, supra note 115, at 292 (“[R]etribution alone is a necessary limit on the consti-
tutional use of capital punishment. Indeed, it is hard to make much sense of the Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence without such an understanding.”).
121 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 38–39 (1st ed. 1987); see also
DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 56 (“[A] compelling utilitarian argument for Coker’s execution
was possible.”).
122 Steiker, supra note 115, at 292.
123 Pamela A. Wilkins, Rethinking Categorical Prohibitions on Capital Punishment: How the
Current Test Fails Mentally Ill Offenders and What to Do About It, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 423,
455–56 (2009).
124 Id. at 458.
125 See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745,
1756 (2012) (asserting that cases such as Roper, Atkins, and Kennedy suggest “the ascendency
of retributive limitations on punishment”); J. Richard Broughton, Kennedy and the Tail of
Minos, 69 LA. L. REV. 593, 601 (2009) (“Both Coker and Kennedy, though, assert what appear
to be primarily retributive bases for applying a categorical exemption . . . .”); Howe, Resolving
the Conflict, supra note 15, at 346 (asserting that “[t]he retributive basis for the Court’s judgment
[in Coker] was clear”); Youngjae Lee, Desert and the Eighth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 101, 101 (2009) (asserting that cases such as Coker, Atkins, and Roper are “best understood
as retributivist constraint cases that prohibit the imposition of capital punishment on certain
groups of offenders because they do not deserve it”).
126 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
127 See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, Repudiating the Narrowing Rule in Capital Sentencing, 2012
BYU L. REV. 1477, 1520 [hereinafter Howe, Repudiating]; Howe, Resolving the Conflict, supra
note 15, at 346–50; Howe, The Failed Case, supra note 100, at 830–35.
128 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
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that the capital sentencer remain free to reject the death penalty based on “any aspect
of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”129 This mandate is hard to
understand other than as an effort to pursue the same principle that explains the Coker
line of cases. Just as the death penalty is inapplicable to categories of offenses and of-
fenders in which the sanction is usually undeserved, the offender’s deserts, based on
individualized consideration, should also restrict the imposition of the death penalty.130
Because dozens of factors might affect a deserts determination—youth, mental disabil-
ity, and intoxication, to name only a few—the necessary evaluation generally could not
be guided by the definition of the capital crime.131 Therefore, the capital-sentencing
hearing, governed by the Lockett rule, provides the refined inquiry needed to try to en-
sure that no person receives the death penalty who does not deserve it.132
Consequentialist theory also cannot work to justify the individualization mandate.
There would be no reason to require a sentencing inquiry to determine whether a death
sentence for a murderer deters crime better than a milder sanction. The sentencing
judge would be much more poorly positioned to resolve that question than the legis-
lature,133 and the question is one that warrants a categorical answer rather than repeated
answers by individual sentencing judges.134 Likewise, if the pursuit of general deter-
rence could justify the sanction, there would be no reason to hold a hearing simply to
determine whether the need for incapacitation could also justify it.135 Any consequen-
tialist benefit from the sanction should be enough to sustain it if consequential theory
could suffice at all.136 What would be the basis for preferring one consequentialist bene-
fit over another? The failure of consequentialist theory to proscribe the mandatory sen-
tence underscores the need for the prohibition to be grounded on an entirely different
theory—namely, a view about retributive limits.
Scholars of capital-sentencing law recognize that Lockett and Coker serve the same
principle. Jordan and Carol Steiker have emphasized that the individualized sentencing
requirement connotes a retributive focus,137 and, like the Lockett holding, “seems to en-
shrine retribution alone as a necessary condition for the constitutional imposition of the
death penalty.”138 Youngjae Lee has noted this “theoretical connection” in concluding
129 Id. at 604.
130 See Howe, Resolving the Conflict, supra note 15, at 349–50.
131 See Howe, The Failed Case, supra note 100, at 831.
132 See id. at 831–32.
133 See Howe, Resolving the Conflict, supra note 15, at 341.
134 Id.
135 See id. at 341–42.
136 See id.
137 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individu-
alization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 845–46 (1992) (noting that a
principle of individualization requires a capital sentencer “to consider evidence relating to a
defendant’s reduced culpability for his or her crime”).
138 Steiker, supra note 115, at 293.
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that the Court’s mandate of individualized consideration was “driven,” like the propor-
tionality decisions, by the goal of protecting against undeserved death sentences.139
Kyron Huigens has explained that “[t]he Court’s real concern [in mandating indi-
vidualized sentencing]”—and indeed the concern that actually explains Furman—is
“proportionality in punishment.”140 In sum, the scholary commentary confirms that
“[t]he overriding aim of regulating capital sentencing under the eighth amendment is
to ensure that only murderers who deserve death sentences receive them . . . .”141
2. Non-Capital Cases
In the non-capital context, the Court has granted substantive or procedural protec-
tion based on disproportionality in five circumstances:
• In 1910, in Weems, to reject a sentence of fifteen years of hard incarcera-
tion and permanent loss of civil liberties for minor offenses involving doc-
ument falsification by a governmental employee.142
• In 1962, in Robinson v. California, to invalidate a California statute
making it a crime “to be addicted to the use of narcotics.”143
• In 1982, in Solem v. Helm, to overturn a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole for a seventh, non-violent felony: uttering a bad check
for $100.144
• In 2010, in Graham v. Florida, to outlaw a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole for a nonhomicide crime by a juvenile.145
• In 2012, in Miller v. Alabama146 and Jackson v. Hobbs,147 to proscribe a
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for any offense
committed by a juvenile.
The first four rulings involved substantive prohibitions on sentences, although only
Robinson and Graham purported to apply much beyond the particular case before the
Court.148 The final ruling in Miller and Hobbs imposed only procedural protections
139 Lee, supra note 16, at 726.
140 Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1203 (2000).
141 Howe, The Constitution, supra note 23, at 785.
142 217 U.S. 349, 351 (1910).
143 370 U.S. 660, 660 (1962). The Court in Robinson was not explicit about the proportionality
explanation. See supra note 21.
144 463 U.S. 277, 277, 281 (1983).
145 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
146 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
147 The Supreme Court consolidated Jackson with Miller v. Alabama. See id.
148 For example, in Weems, the Court did not clarify to what extent it was proscribing against
other offenders the particular sentence imposed on Weems for his crime. See 217 U.S. 349, 366
(1910) (“[S]uch penalties for such offenses amaze . . . .”). In Helm, the Court employed a narrow,
fact-bound analysis that implied that the ruling was limited to Helm and few others. See 463 U.S.
at 296–97.
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without altogether prohibiting the sentences in question even against the defendants
before the Court.149 Thus, the five rulings involve a variety of problems and solutions.
The common denominator among the rulings is their grounding on a deserts limita-
tion. The first four, involving substantive rejections of punishments, concern sanctions
that are plausibly thought to serve instrumental ends.150 One could rationally conclude
that punishing even minor offenders with severe terms of incarceration could better
deter other potential offenders and incapacitate the defendants than would milder sanc-
tions.151 Certainly, punishing a seven-time offender with long incarceration seems ra-
tionally aimed at those ends. Criminal punishment could plausibly deter drug addiction
and reduce the potential for the defendant’s addiction to cause him to commit further
crimes.152 Likewise, for the same reason that the death penalty could deter and incapaci-
tate when imposed on juvenile offenders,153 sentences of life imprisonment without
parole could also provide those benefits. The Court could hardly deny that these punish-
ments have utility, and it is in a poor position to measure how great the utility might be.
For the Court to assert that these punishments are undeserved, however, is for it to ren-
der the very sort of value judgment that the protection against excessiveness calls upon
the Justices to make.154
The fifth ruling, rejecting mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without parole
for juveniles,155 is also best understood in conjunction with retributive theory. This pro-
cedural mandate incorporates the essence of the individualization requirement from cap-
ital sentencing, which builds on a deserts limitation.156 For the same reason that the
adult murderer’s deserts, based on individualized consideration, can limit the use of the
death sanction, the juvenile murderer’s deserts, based on individualized consideration,
can limit the imposition of life imprisonment without parole.
Scholars recently have begun to acknowledge the retributive basis for proportional-
ity protection in the non-capital context. For example, Youngjae Lee has concluded,
regarding Graham, that “the Eighth Amendment right against excessive punishment is
defined by the retributivist constraint.”157 Likewise, Richard Bierschbach has concluded
that Graham appears to be part of a “trend” that “suggests the ascendancy of retributive
149 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
150 See supra notes 101–20 and accompanying text.
151 See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 15; cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE 208–09 (1981) (discussing deterrence as a rationale for revenge and retaliation).
152 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 683–84 (2002) (Clark, J., dissenting)
(asserting that punishment could deter drug addiction and, thus, a variety of crimes stemming
from the addiction).
153 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
154 The Justices surely can attempt to discern and pursue the community’s deeper values in
its necessary task of articulating moral values. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Speakable
Ethics and Constitutional Law: A Review Essay, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1523, 1543 (1989).
155 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
156 See supra text accompanying notes 126–41.
157 Youngjae Lee, The Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 58, 60 (2010).
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limitations on punishment.”158 Indeed, the central penological explanation in both cap-
ital and non-capital cases for the Court’s findings of disproportionality lies with the
deserts limitation.
II. DE-EMPHASIZING THE DESERTS LIMITATION
In this Part, I contend that the Supreme Court has generally obscured the impor-
tance of the deserts limitation in justifying the proportionality mandate. I divide the
discussion into two sections. First, I focus on the Court’s approaches to identifying ex-
cessive punishment in the era from Weems159 through the end of the twentieth century,
when proportionality protections appeared to have stagnated after a burst of expansion
in the 1970s and 1980s.160 I then focus on the Court’s approaches in the new millen-
nium, when the expansion of protections revived.161 I demonstrate that, before the end
of the century, the Court sometimes hinted at the importance of the deserts limitation
in the capital cases, but it largely avoided those suggestions in the non-capital context.
I also contend that, despite the flurry of activity in the new millennium, the Justices
have begun to employ an approach to identifying disproportionality in both the capital
and non-capital contexts that masks the central role of retributive theory.
A. Historical Approaches
From Weems162 to the end of the twentieth century, the Court employed enigmatic,
incoherent, or inconsistent measures of excessive punishment. In the 1970s, it began to
foster the idea that excessiveness protections should mostly restrict the death penalty.163
Thereafter, the Court began to hint in the capital cases at the importance of offender
“culpability” in resolving proportionality questions,164 but, even in that context, avoided
developing a transparent penological theory of the Eighth Amendment.165 In the non-
death-penalty context, the Court developed a methodology for identifying dispropor-
tionality that both eschewed any penological theory about excessiveness and rendered
the mandate almost moribund.166
1. The Emergence of the “Death is Different” Idea and the Capital-Case Approaches
to Proportionality
When the Justices began to focus on the Eighth Amendment to limit the death pen-
alty in the 1970s, the Court could not turn to any previously developed framework in
158 Bierschbach, supra note 125, at 1756.
159 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
160 See infra Part II.A.
161 See infra Part II.B.
162 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
163 See infra notes 177–82 and accompanying text.
164 See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
165 See infra notes 183–91 and accompanying text.
166 See infra Part II.A.2.
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its past opinions to determine when a punishment was excessive. In Weems,167 the
Court had not developed a penological theory to explain why the punishment in relation
to the crimes was too severe. The Court had simply asserted, that “[t]here are degrees
of homicide that are not punished so severely”168 and that “[s]uch penalties for such of-
fenses amaze those who have formed their conception of the relation of a state to even
its offending citizens from the practice of the American commonwealths . . . .”169 Like-
wise, in Robinson v. California, the Court essentially asserted only that the statute
making addiction to narcotics a crime was improper because one could become ad-
dicted “innocently or involuntarily.”170 Rather than explain why that unlikely possibility
should altogether invalidate the statute under the Eighth Amendment, the majority only
crudely analogized that “[e]ven one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punish-
ment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”171
Having not established a definition of excessive punishment or a methodology for
identifying it, the Court failed to explain its initial forays into regulating the death pen-
alty under the Eighth Amendment in transparent fashion. The meaning of the Court’s
terse per curiam opinion in Furman,172 along with the five concurring opinions, was fa-
mously uncertain.173 Indeed, Furman was not widely understood for decades as having
presented a problem of undeserved punishment, as opposed to one of inequality.174
Likewise, when the Court followed Furman by requiring individualized sentencing in
capital cases, its Eighth Amendment explanation was initially obscure.175 The Lockett
plurality rested its case primarily on the banal assertion that
a statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving
independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s charac-
ter and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in
mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed
in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.176
167 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
168 Id. at 380.
169 Id. at 366–67.
170 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
171 Id.
172 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
173 See generally, e.g., Steiker, supra note 61.
174 See id.
175 When the Court first struck down a mandatory death penalty in Woodson v. North
Carolina, the plurality’s most enlightening statement was that a mandatory statute excluded
from consideration “the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the
diverse frailties of humankind.” 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). Other rationales that the plurality
offered were even less connected with penological theory or with any established view of the
Eighth Amendment. See Howe, Resolving the Conflict, supra note 15, at 370–71.
176 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
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One idea that emerged with some clarity in the 1970s was that “death is [ ] differ-
ent” for Eighth Amendment purposes.177 In Lockett, for example, the plurality needed
to explain why a mandatory death penalty was improper when the Court had never pro-
scribed mandatory prison sentences.178 The plurality asserted that capital punishment
is “profoundly different from all other penalties” because of the “nonavailability of cor-
rective or modifying mechanisms with respect to an executed capital sentence.”179 This
“death is [ ] different”180 notion continued to carry importance in proportionality doc-
trine for the next thirty years.181 While the Court during that era repeatedly granted
Eighth Amendment protections against the death penalty, it only once rejected a non-
capital sentence as cruel and unusual.182
In the capital cases after the 1970s, the Justices sometimes hinted at the role of the
deserts limitation in supporting both procedural and substantive protections, but the
Court was hardly clear. On the procedural side, the Court repeatedly rejected capital-
sentencing laws and practices for failing to satisfy the Lockett standard,183 but its opin-
ions through the mid-1980s provided little elucidation about the penological theory that
justified the Lockett rule. Some clarification began to emerge when Justice Powell con-
tended in a concurring opinion in 1986 that the rationale focused on the need to assess
177 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977). The first emphasis in a majority opinion on
the distinction came in Gardner v. Florida. There, the Court overturned a death sentence on due
process grounds because portions of a pre-sentence report on which the judge relied to sentence
Gardner to death were not disclosed to the parties. Id. The majority asserted that “death is a
different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country.” Id.
178 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 589.
179 Id. at 605.
180 Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357.
181 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(noting that, in the non-capital context, the Court before 2010 had authorized only “narrow
proportionality” review under which the standards for relief were “rigorous”).
182 See Solem v. Helm, 436 U.S. 277 (1983) (rejecting life imprisonment under the Eighth
Amendment as cruel and unusual when applied to a repeat minor felony offender).
183 See, e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 439–44 (1990) (invalidating require-
ment that jury find mitigating circumstances unanimously); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328
(1989) (holding that a Texas statute did not allow the jury sufficient opportunity to reject the
death penalty based on mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse); Hitch-
cock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398–99 (1987) (reversing a death sentence based on statutory
interpretation by state courts that only mitigating factors appearing on a statutory list could be
considered by sentencer); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 77–85 (1987) (invalidating a manda-
tory death penalty for intentional murder by an inmate serving a life sentence without the pos-
sibility of parole); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5–8 (1986) (overturning a capital
sentence where the trial judge had refused to allow the sentencing jury to consider evidence of
a defendant’s good behavior while incarcerated pending trial); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 112–13 (1982) (invalidating a capital sentence imposed based on a statute interpreted
by state courts to prevent consideration of a defendant’s emotional disturbance and violent and
tumultuous childhood).
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offender “culpability,”184 and when Justice O’Connor emphasized that same point in a
concurring opinion the following year.185 Justice O’Connor also presented that view in
her majority opinion in Penry v. Lynaugh, where the Court rejected the Texas death
statute as it applied to a defendant who offered mitigating evidence of his mental retar-
dation and childhood abuse.186 Justice O’Connor asserted that the principle underlying
Lockett is that “punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of
the criminal defendant.”187 These statements were not entirely accurate both because
Lockett allowed an assessment of general deserts based on the offender’s full life, not
simply his culpability for the capital crime,188 and because Lockett was not offended if
an offender who deserved the death penalty escaped it.189 However, these statements at
least hinted at a retributive rationale for Furman190 and the individualization rule.191
On the substantive side in capital cases, the Court was even less explicit that pro-
portionality was about retributive excess. In Coker, where the Court rejected the death
penalty for rape of an adult victim,192 the plurality stated that “a punishment is ‘exces-
sive’ and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals
of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition
of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.”193
This was an opaque way of saying that a punishment is excessive if it substantially ex-
ceeds the deserts limitation.194 Relying on its “own judgment,” the Court found that the
184 In Skipper v. South Carolina, Justice Powell contended in a concurring opinion that Lockett
was concerned with evidence “that lessens the defendant’s culpability for the crime for which
he was convicted” and that the culpability determination was “central to the fundamental justice
of execution.” 476 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1986) (emphasis added).
185 See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
186 Penry, 492 U.S. at 328.
187 Id. at 319.
188 The Court recently made this point in Porter v. McCollum, when it reversed a death sen-
tence based on ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to present, among other
information, evidence of Porter’s heroic military service in the Korean war. 558 U.S. 30 (2009).
The Court concluded that this information would have been pertinent, in part, simply because it
was a highly honorable action. See id. at 43–44; see also Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4 (holding that evi-
dence of a defendant’s good behavior while incarcerated pending trial should have been admitted
at sentencing, although the evidence did not relate to the petitioner’s “culpability for the [capital]
crime,” because the jury “could have drawn favorable inferences from this testimony regarding
petitioner’s character”).
189 See Howe, The Failed Case, supra note 100, at 832–33.
190 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
191 See, e.g., Howe, Repudiating, supra note 127, at 1505–07, 1520–22; Howe, Resolving the
Conflict, supra note 15, at 337–50.
192 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
193 Id. at 592.
194 I have previously explained the convolution as follows:
If a punishment substantially exceeds the level of appropriate retribution
for a crime, as the Court implicitly concluded in Coker, it would appar-
ently violate the second prong of this test and, on that basis alone, infringe
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punishment was improper under the second prong,195 and the discussion implicitly re-
vealed that the only consideration for the plurality under that prong was the level of ap-
propriate retribution.196 Because retribution is clearly an appropriate goal of punishment
under the first prong, the retributive inquiry would be dispositive in all cases. Yet, the
plurality’s approach obscured that the inquiry was all about that question.197
The Court’s capital cases applying Coker through the end of the century continued
to obscure the deserts limitation as the explanation for the proportionality mandate. The
Court soon protected a few felony murderers in Enmund v. Florida,198 but the majority,
unlike the plurality in Coker,199 discussed deterrence considerations, as well as the limits
of appropriate retribution, as if only the first prong of the Coker test remained.200 Al-
though Enmund won, this approach masked the point that any punishment that ex-
ceeded—or at least “grossly” exceeded201—retributive limits should be disproportional
under Coker.202 Likewise, the Court’s proportionality analysis was muddled in Thomp-
son v. Oklahoma, when it rejected the death penalty for fifteen-year-old offenders who
were sentenced under death statutes that did not specify a minimum age.203 Justice
O’Connor’s dispositive concurring opinion again discussed both deterrence and retribu-
tion as bearing on the proportionality question.204 When the Court initially upheld the
death penalty for seventeen- and eighteen-year-old offenders in Stanford v. Kentucky,205
the Eighth Amendment. But, since retribution is plainly an acceptable goal
of punishment, if a punishment serves retributive goals, it necessarily sat-
isfies both prongs of this test. Therefore, the retributive inquiry appears to
be dispositive.
Howe, Resolving the Conflict, supra note 15, at 347 n.96.
195 Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.
196 See DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 56–57.
197 Although the plurality in Coker ultimately applied its own judgment about whether the
punishment was disproportionate, it also claimed to find support in objective evidence, and this
kind of search for societal consensus became an important distraction in later cases. See infra
note 207 and accompanying text. The plurality looked at how many legislatures around the coun-
try authorized the death penalty for rape and how often juries actually imposed death for that
crime, and concluded that the evidence confirmed its conclusion that death was “a disproportion-
ate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman.” Coker, 433 U.S. at 593–97. I have argued
elsewhere that the plurality’s arguments that this evidence revealed a societal consensus were
unpersuasive. See Howe, Resolving the Conflict, supra note 15, at 346 & n.89.
198 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
199 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
200 See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798–800.
201 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
202 In limiting the Enmund holding in Tison v. Arizona, the Court also noted with apparent
approval that the Enmund opinion had focused on both deterrence and retribution as relevant
to identifying disproportionality. See 481 U.S. 137, 148–49 (1987).
203 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
204 See id. at 853.
205 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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and for mentally retarded offenders in Penry v. Lynaugh,206 it further muddled the ques-
tion of how to identify disproportionality. In both cases, the Court seemed to say that
a finding of disproportionality hinged heavily on whether objective evidence es-
tablished a societal consensus against the punishment in the relevant circumstance,207
which ignored the very premise of excessiveness doctrine—that society might accept
an unjustly severe punishment on instrumental grounds.208 Thus, all of the Court’s
opinions concerning categorical prohibitions on the death penalty failed to reveal
that the issue of central importance was whether the death penalty amounted to
retributive excess.
2. The Non-Capital Cases
The Court’s proportionality standards in non-capital cases between 1970 and 2000
avoided any concession that a punishment was excessive if undeserved. In Rummel v.
Estelle,209 the Court upheld a sentence imposed under a Texas recidivist statute of life
imprisonment, with possible parole, for a third-time, minor felony.210 A five-Justice
majority seemed to assert that, in non-capital felony cases, it would defer to legislative
prerogative on the length of prison sentences.211 The dissenters contended that the Court
should evaluate three criteria to determine excessiveness: (1) the gravity of the crime
compared to the severity of the sentence; (2) the sentence imposed for the same offense
in other states; and (3) the sentences imposed on others in the same state.212 The major-
ity eschewed these factors as too subjective to support judicial review of legislation.213
Moreover, the majority concluded that the obvious instrumental objectives of deterrence
and incapacitation were adequate to justify the Texas statute.214
After reaffirming Rummel’s harsh message in Hutto v. Davis,215 the Court seemed
to change course, although without explicitly acknowledging that disproportionality
was about retributive excess. In Solem v. Helm, a five-Justice majority struck down a
206 492 U.S. 302, 328–35 (1989).
207 See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377 (plurality opinion); id. at 363, 382 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(favoring consideration also of “age-based statutory classifications”); Penry, 492 U.S. at 333–35.
208 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 614–16 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (speci-
fying examples of why death as punishment for adult rape may not be considered excessive in
many states).
209 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
210 Rummel had obtained $120.75 by false pretenses. See id. at 266.
211 See id. at 273–75 (distinguishing Weems because of the unusual nature of the accessories
that were part of cadena temporal).
212 See, e.g., id. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting).
213 See, e.g., id. at 275–76 (“[T]he lines to be drawn are indeed ‘subjective,’ and therefore
properly within the province of legislatures, not courts.”).
214 See id. at 284.
215 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (upholding two consecutive twenty-year sentences for possession
with intent to distribute and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana).
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sentence of life imprisonment without parole imposed under a South Dakota “recidivist
statute” for a seventh felony: passing a bad check for $100.216 The Court clarified that
the proportionality principle did apply to felony-prison sentences, even if successful
challenges should be “exceedingly rare.”217 In rejecting Helm’s sentence, the Court also
applied the same criteria that it had eschewed as too subjective in Rummel.218 In re-
solving the first issue, concerning the relative gravity of the offense, the majority sug-
gested the importance of retributive considerations—“the harm caused or threatened
to the victim or society[,] and the culpability of the offender.”219 Unlike in Rummel, the
Court did not assert that the statute was fine as long as it might serve instrumental
goals.220 Nonetheless, by emphasizing the need for objective evidence and focusing as
well on inter-state and intra-state comparisons of punishment,221 the Court effectively
denied that the measure of excessiveness was the deserts limitation. After all, many
states might implement tough recidivist statutes on instrumental grounds—deter-
rence and incapacitation—as the Court acknowledged in Rummel.222 The sentencing
state might also impose harsh punishments for other crimes on the same instrumen-
tal rationales. Consequently, the comparisons could fail to root out many grossly un-
deserved sentences.
The Court later confronted the apparent conflict between Rummel and Solem and
did not resolve it. In Harmelin v. Michigan,223 the Court affirmed a mandatory sentence
of life imprisonment without parole for possession of 650 grams of cocaine. Five
Justices voted to uphold the sentence, but there was no majority opinion.224 Justice
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist adopted a categorical position—“the Eighth Amend-
ment contains no proportionality guarantee.”225 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
O’Connor and Souter, concluded that the Eighth Amendment provided a “narrow pro-
portionality principle,”226 but that Harmelin’s sentence did not infringe it.227 Those three
Justices declined to apply the second and third prongs of the Solem test on the view that
application of the first prong did not lead to an inference of gross disproportionality.228
In applying the first prong, they asserted “that the Eighth Amendment does not mandate
216 463 U.S. 277, 279, 281–82 (1983).
217 Id. at 289–90 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272).
218 See id. at 290–92.
219 Id. at 293.
220 See generally Rummel, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
221 Solem, 463 U.S. at 278, 298–300.
222 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
223 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
224 Id.
225 Id. at 965 (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
226 Id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., joined by O’Connor, J., & Souter, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment).
227 See id. at 996–1009.
228 See id. at 1004–05.
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adoption of any one penological theory,”229 and ultimately upheld the draconian
Michigan statute because they could not say that it “ha[d] no chance of success” as a
deterrent to drug dealing and the dangers flowing from it.230 Thus, they did not simply
obscure retributive excess as the measure of disproportionate punishment but purported
to reject it.
B. Post-2000 Approaches
In the new millennium, the Court has continued to camouflage the central role of
the deserts limitation in defining excessive punishment. The Court has expanded pro-
portionality protections in both the capital and non-capital contexts and has now aban-
doned the idea that “death is [ ] different”231 from any other sanction. However, it has
perpetuated a strategy for defining disproportionality that allows it to closely confine
the doctrine. The essence of the approach is to define disproportionality according to
an amalgam of penological considerations, including deterrence, and, thus, to downplay
the role of retributive theory. In addition, the Court has purported to weigh objective
evidence of public consensus regarding punishments, a tactic that the Court can use
inconsistently in future cases to further filter excessiveness claims. The use of these
methodologies suggests a continuing desire by the Justices to avoid the logic of the
deserts limitation.
In the three capital cases in which the Court recently granted proportionality
relief—Atkins,232 Simmons,233 and Kennedy234—the Court used both strategies to down-
play the retributive measure and cabin the breadth of the holdings. In all three cases, the
Court purported to find that the death penalty in the relevant context would fail to
adequately serve instrumental ends in addition to otherwise being too severe.235 These
contentions were unpersuasive. In all three contexts—involving mentally retarded of-
fenders, juvenile offenders, and child rapists—one could rationally conclude that the
death penalty might well provide a marginal deterrent and incapacitating benefit,236 and
the Court provided no empirical case to the contrary. In all three cases, the Court also
purported to find objective evidence of a societal consensus against the death penalty
in the relevant context.237 Yet, again, the objective evidence failed to show that an
229 Id. at 999.
230 Id. at 1008.
231 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977).
232 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
233 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
234 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
235 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20; Simmons, 543 U.S. at 571–72; Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at
2663–64.
236 See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
237 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–16; Simmons, 543 U.S. at 579–81; Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at
2651–53.
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enduring consensus had developed against using the death penalty against all of these
offenders.238 Only a minority of death-penalty states had passed laws against executing
the mentally retarded;239 twenty states permitted executing at least some juvenile
offenders;240 and an evident legislative trend was actually developing in favor of ex-
ecuting certain child rapists.241 The willingness of the majority in each case to offer
these feeble arguments suggests an effort to de-emphasize the importance of the
deserts limitation.242
In the non-capital context, the Court has expanded protections, but only in a minor
way and without conceding that retributive excess is the measure of disproportionality.
In some respects, the Court has decisively rejected expansion. In Ewing v. California,243
five Justices rebuffed a challenge to a sentence of twenty-five years to life imprison-
ment imposed on a minor-felony offender, under a California statute known as “Three
Strikes and You’re Out.”244 Justices Scalia and Thomas contended that the Eighth
Amendment contains no proportionality principle.245 A three-Justice plurality contended
that the Eighth Amendment contains a “narrow proportionality principle,”246 but that
it was not violated.247 The plurality acknowledged that the explanation for the California
statute was “incapacitating and deterring repeat offenders.”248 This statement all
but conceded that the punishment imposed on Ewing was more than he deserved.
238 For the viewpoint that changes after 1989 in societal beliefs about the death penalty gen-
erally, not changes noted under the Court’s “evolving standards” analysis, largely explain the
Court’s willingness to expand proportionality protections beginning in 2002, see generally
Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 35–57 (2007).
239 Only eighteen of the thirty-eight death-penalty states at the time barred the execution of
the mentally retarded. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
240 Simmons, 543 U.S. at 579–80.
241 See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2669 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that, in addition to
Louisiana, five states had enacted targeted capital child-rape laws in recent years, despite
uncertainty created by dicta in Coker over their validity).
242 In all three cases, the Court also engaged in ad hoc rationalizations that could be used to
distinguish future proportionality claims. In Atkins, for example, the majority asserted that men-
tally retarded defendants, because of their impaired ability to confront the legal system, “face a
special risk of wrongful execution.” 536 U.S. at 305. In Simmons, the majority discussed exten-
sively the opposition to the execution of juvenile offenders in the international community. See
543 U.S. at 575–78. In Kennedy, the majority contended that capital child-rape prosecutions, “by
enlisting the child victim to assist it over the course of years in asking for capital punishment
forces a moral choice on the child, who is not of mature age to make that choice,” while also con-
tending that because the child-rapist is often a family member, the victim “may be more likely
to shield the perpetrator from discovery” where the possible penalty is death. Kennedy, 128 S.
Ct. at 2662–64.
243 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
244 Id. at 14.
245 See id. at 31–32 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring).
246 Id. at 20.
247 Id. at 30.
248 Id. at 14.
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Nonetheless, the plurality reiterated Justice Kennedy’s statement in Harmelin that the
Eighth Amendment “does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.”249 As
a result, as in Harmelin, the plurality explicitly rejected retributive excess as the stan-
dard of disproportionate punishment.250
The recent juvenile cases in which the Court announced protections against life im-
prisonment without parole also mask the true importance of the deserts limitation. In
both Graham and Miller, the Court portrayed its disproportionality finding as based not
simply on retributive excess, but on the inadequacy of various penological justifications
including deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.251 Yet, the arguments about the
inadequacy of these consequentialist factors to justify the sentences were unconvincing,
and the Court provided no empirical support for them. Just as with the death penalty,
one could rationally conclude that there were instrumental benefits to be gained from
imposing life imprisonment without parole on certain youthful offenders in nonhomi-
cide cases and mandatorily on certain youthful murderers.252 Likewise, the Court pur-
ported to find objective evidence in Graham of a societal consensus against life
imprisonment without parole against nonhomicidal juveniles.253 The Court also claimed
to find such a consensus in Miller, where it rejected mandatory life imprisonment with-
out parole for juvenile murders.254 Yet the objective evidence actually failed to show a
clear and enduring societal consensus on either issue. In Graham, the evidence revealed
that thirty-eight jurisdictions permitted life imprisonment without parole for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders,255 and that 123 offenders were currently serving that sentence
in eleven states.256 In Miller, the dissent noted that “nearly 2,500” juvenile murderers
were serving that sentence and that “over 2,000” of them received it under mandatory
statutes.257 The weakness of the majority’s arguments on these points suggests that they
served largely as a fig leaf to hide the central role of the deserts limitation.258
249 Id. at 25 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
250 In Lockyer v. Andrade, the Court also reversed a ruling by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit that had overturned Andrade’s sentence to two consecutive terms of twenty-
five years to life imprisonment under the California three-strikes law. 538 U.S. 63 (2003). The
Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit had failed to properly apply provisions of the federal
habeas statute requiring deference to state court decisions. Id. at 75–77.
251 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 2028–30 (2010).
252 See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
253 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2025–26.
254 The Court made the argument in a backhanded way, contending that the “‘objective
indicia’ . . . do not distinguish these cases from others holding that a sentencing practice vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment.” 132 S. Ct. at 2471.
255 See 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
256 Id. at 2024.
257 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
258 In all three cases, the Court also engaged in ad hoc rationalizations that could be used to
distinguish future proportionality claims. See supra note 242.
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III. DANGERS OF THE DESERTS LIMITATION
In this Part, I explore why the Supreme Court would want to avoid endorsing the
deserts limitation as the measure of excessive punishment. I contend that there are at
least four reasons. The first is the complexity of any effort to determine and articulate
a comprehensive code of desert limits. The second concerns the troublesome one-way
ratchet effect of a grant of proportionality relief. The third stems from the negative im-
pact that strict regulation of criminal sentences by the Court could have on the already
reduced sanctions that result from plea bargaining. The fourth involves the possible
harm to the Court’s institutional standing if it were to demand adherence to an ideal
that regularly has been ignored by the citizenry. Although the moral appeal of the de-
serts limitation has sometimes proven irresistible for the Court, I contend that these
pragmatic concerns legitimately deter the Justices from endorsing and fully pursuing
that principle.
A. Complexity
Fully pursuing a deserts limitation under the Eighth Amendment would pose an im-
possible challenge for the Court. The Justices would have to reject the definitions for
a large number of crimes and defenses, amend many criminal procedure rules, and
overturn a plethora of sentencing laws and practices259 along with many individual sen-
tences under such practices. The challenge would also be ongoing because, no matter
how much rule making the Court pursued, individual punishments often could still be
challenged as too severe, and because deserts limitations would surely change over
time. The Court lacks the resources and wisdom to address all of the cases that it would
need to take on and resolve to guide such a complicated, continuing effort.
One can start to imagine the complexity of the task of regulating substantive crim-
inal law by considering only a single area of doctrine in which instrumental ends often
trump retributive limits—mistakes of law. The general rule, of course, is that igno-
rance or mistake as to the existence or meaning of a criminal law is no defense to its
violation.260 This rule rests primarily on instrumental grounds, rather than on a theory
of appropriate retribution.261 However, sometimes ignorance of the law combined with
its violation is blameworthy conduct.262 But, precisely when is that true? The Court
would have to decide. Would negligent or reckless ignorance suffice? Or should only
purposeful ignorance work? Answers should not be the same for every kind of crime
or for every kind of offender. Failure to know about a food stamp regulation may
259 For a list of examples of such laws and practices, see supra notes 7–12 and accom-
panying text.
260 See, e.g., People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1069 (N.Y. 1987).
261 See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 81, at 48.
262 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 308 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing the “early notion”
that the criminal law is “knowable” and that people should know it).
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not be the same as failure to know about a regulation on possession of machine guns.263
Likewise, regarding regulations on transporting dangerous materials on the highways,
the ignorance of officials of a large trucking company may not be the same as the ig-
norance of an individual hauling trash to a landfill.264 When one thinks about the com-
plexity of these problems as they arise for thousands of crimes across all the states, the
task seems daunting. When one considers that the Court would also have to consider
the possible retributive injustice behind many other laws—including the felony-murder
rule,265 vicarious liability doctrines,266 and restrictions on the insanity and intoxication
defenses,267 just to name a few—the task appears overwhelming.
Regarding criminal sentences, specifying maximum deserved punishments would
be even more complicated and thus equally infeasible. For any crime, the Court would
potentially need to specify the maximum deserved punishment based on the harm
caused. How much for a burglary in which the victim was not home? How much for
an aggravated assault against a family member involving debilitating injuries? How
much for selling a single dose of heroin? How much for a kidnapping and lewd and
lascivious act against a fourteen-year-old? How much for being the getaway driver in
a spree of three liquor store robberies? If the defendant committed multiple crimes,
should special rules restrict consecutive sentences?268 The list of possible criminal sce-
narios would go on and on.
Uncertainties over how to measure deserts would further complicate efforts to im-
pose a code of desert limitations.269 Should the Court assess only the offender’s culpa-
bility for the charged offense or his life in a broader sense? If the focus is on “general
deserts” or “moral merit,”270 based on a lifetime of good and bad works, the inquiry
263 Compare Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (holding that conviction under
federal law criminalizing improper possession of food stamps requires proof that the defendant
knew that he was acting in a manner that was unauthorized), with United States v. Freed, 401
U.S. 601 (1971) (holding that conviction under federal law criminalizing improper possession
of firearms did not require proof that recipient of unregistered hand grenades knew they
were unregistered).
264 See, e.g., United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 560 (1971)
(holding, in a case involving a large commercial enterprise defendant, that proof of knowledge
of existence of regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission was not required under federal
statute imposing criminal penalties on whoever “knowingly violates any such regulation”).
265 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
266 See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) (holding that the
death penalty cannot be applied in cases based on vicarious liability).
267 See supra note 21; infra note 326.
268 See generally Nancy J. King, Proportioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Succes-
sive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 105 (1995) (contending that “cumulative
excessiveness” review is needed).
269 See LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 217 (1987) (“Desert . . . is not often
put to the test of specificity and even resists it.”).
270 I coined these terms in a previous article to refer to an inquiry into “the offender’s deserts
based on all aspects of his life.” Howe, Resolving the Conflict, supra note 15, at 351 (empha-
sis added).
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becomes especially complex. One might think the best course would be to stick with
culpability for the charged offense, but that choice requires ignoring, for example, evi-
dence that the offender served honorably and courageously in the war-time military or
otherwise led a life involving mostly meritorious conduct.271 Moreover, even if the fo-
cus is on culpability alone, the assessment remains difficult. If actors are generally free
from determinism and, for this reason, are culpable, the Court would have to resolve
when an actor is only partially culpable.272 How much should a defendant’s deserts
change for a crime if he were not an average adult but, variously, a fifteen-year-old; a
mentally ill adult; a mildly mentally retarded eighteen-year-old or person impaired by
extended use of crack cocaine? How much should the Court reduce the offender’s
blameworthiness based on his poverty or his other past social deprivations?273 The list
of difficult scenarios that the Court would confront would never end.
Complications would also arise over whether and how to measure an offender’s ac-
tual experience with punishment.274 Inmates vary in their reactions to incarceration,275
and the conditions in various prison settings also differ.276 Yet, courts would have trou-
ble accurately determining how much pain the particular defendant would experience
or even predicting the defendant’s future prison situation.277
The Court would also face problems over how regional differences about deserved
punishment should matter. Desert limitations do not exist in a vacuum but rather in a
social context.278 For this reason, deserts limitations for a particular crime and offender
can be different in divergent cultural communities.279 European countries no longer
271 See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009) (reversing a death sentence based on
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to present, among other things, evidence of Porter’s
heroic military service in the Korean War).
272 See Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate in Capital Sentencing:
Darrow’s Defense of Leopold & Loeb, 79 IOWA L. REV. 989, 1012 (1994).
273 See Barbara A. Hudson, Mitigation for Socially Deprived Offenders, in PRINCIPLED
SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY & POLICY 205–07 (Andrew Von Hirsch & Andrew
Ashworth eds., 2d ed. 1998) (discussing how “personal-social” characteristics can weigh on
sentencing decisions).
274 Compare Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
182, 182 (2009) (“[A] successful justification of punishment must take account of offenders’ sub-
jective experiences when assessing punishment severity.”), with Dan Markel & Chad Flanders,
Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CAL. L. REV.
907, 911 (2010) (“If retributive punishment is not about matching pain for pain but rather serves
as an attempt to communicate to the offender society’s condemnation by means of a deprivation
of an objective good such as liberty, then the idiosyncratic experience of the offender will hardly
matter—if at all.”).
275 See Kolber, supra note 274, at 208–09.
276 Id. at 188.
277 See id. at 195–96.
278 See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, Desert, Deontology, and Vengeance, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1141,
1144 (2011).
279 See Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy, and Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1493 (1984)
(“[T]he usual yardsticks . . . are relative to time and place.”).
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punish aggravated murder with the death penalty although the death penalty is some-
times imposed for that crime in the United States.280 Neither position appears right or
wrong as a matter of deserved punishment in a transcendental sense. The question can
only be judged in accordance with “contemporary community morality.”281 For the
same reason, the cultural communities in different regions of the United States might
view the deserved punishments for various crimes differently.282 How should the Court
take these differences into account?283 The difficulty is in deciding what regional com-
munities, if any, warrant deference, and how to judge whether a particular punishment
reflects a valid deserts assessment within such a region, although out of line with the
rest of the country as a whole.
These problems alone render infeasible the goal of fully pursuing a deserts limita-
tion, but they do not end the complexities. Issues would arise simply because prison
terms represent a continuum along which there can be no correct answer.284 The Court
could try to explain its rulings to some degree through an ordinal ranking of crime-and-
offender scenarios, but a serious problem of line drawing would remain. For example,
for the Court to say that the maximum permissible punishment for a burglary by a
slightly mentally retarded seventeen-year-old is fifteen years imprisonment would in-
evitably provoke the questions: Why not thirteen years? Why not seventeen? Why
not fourteen? Why not sixteen? The Court has drawn lines along continua in some
contexts,285 but it has never done so on the scale that would be required to create an
extensive code of desert limitations.
B. One-Way Ratchet Effect
The Justices’ promulgation of a complex code of desert limits would also inevitably
stymie appropriate change by legislatures and sentencing bodies. Societal assessments
of deserved punishment for crimes can change either toward greater leniency or toward
280 Regarding the history of the abolition of the death penalty in Europe, see generally
ANDREW HAMMEL, ENDING THE DEATH PENALTY: THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE (2010).
281 BONNIE ET AL., supra note 88, at 13.
282 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (asserting
that our Constitution “is made for people of fundamentally different views”).
283 See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 282 (1980) (“Absent a constitutionally imposed
uniformity inimical to traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the distinc-
tion of treating particular offenders more severely than any other State.”).
284 The Court has acknowledged this problem. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 (1983)
(“[T]he problem is not so much one of ordering, but one of line-drawing.”).
285 See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010) (holding that protections
associated with assertion of Miranda right to counsel end fourteen days after suspect has
been released from Miranda custody); Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56
(1991) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is presumptively violated when a person arrested
without a warrant does not receive a probable cause determination within forty-eight hours).
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greater severity.286 When the Court limits punishment based on proportionality protec-
tion, it thwarts laws and sentencing practices that conflict in the direction of severity.287
This continuing deterrent effect is problematic given that the very idea of a deserts limi-
tation arises from a social context.288 The Court often could not know when societal no-
tions of desert had changed for the harsher once it had deterred change in that direction.
Examples of crimes for which the punishment has become greater are not hard to
find, as society has taken more seriously the actual or potential harms involved. Punish-
ments for sexual crimes against children have become noticeably more severe in recent
decades.289 Likewise, punishments for the actual and potential harms resulting from
driving while intoxicated have also increased sharply.290 There is sometimes difficulty
in knowing whether punishment increases have resulted from efforts to achieve instru-
mental goals or because the conduct is viewed as more blameworthy, or both. However,
these examples are not ones in which the increases were obviously about only instru-
mental ends. They may also reflect changes in societal notions of deserts. Yet, three
decades ago, if the Court had set maximum deserved punishments for these offenses
derived from then prevailing norms, the changes may not have been possible.
The Eight Amendment favors neither societal change toward viewing particular
conduct as more blameworthy nor less blameworthy than in the past. Although a prohi-
bition on excessiveness speaks in only one direction, social change about deserts in
either direction should be honored. The difficulty is that the Court can hardly judge
deserts without some reference to views about punishment that have currency in a
given period, and those views may not be long-lasting. The death penalty appeared
to have lost much of its popularity in the years before Furman,291 but a societal shift
favoring that sanction commenced immediately after the Supreme Court decision.292
The Furman experience underscores that, unless the Court leaves plenty of leeway for
future societal movement toward severity, its rulings can have a “one-way ratchet
effect,”293 locking in social movements toward leniency, while thwarting changing
286 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2672–73 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting).
287 See id. at 2666–68.
288 See supra notes 278–79 and accompanying text.
289 See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G COMM., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: SEX OFFENSES AGAINST
CHILDREN: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING FEDERAL PENALTIES I (1996)
(“Penalties for sex offenses against children have been increased several times in recent years
and are quite severe.”).
290 See, e.g., 60 Minutes: DWI Deaths: Is it Murder? (CBS television broadcast Jan. 4, 2009),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_162-4694666.html (discussing the increased
tendency in the last decade for prosecutors to pursue serious homicide charges and courts to im-
pose serious prison time for deaths caused by drunk drivers).
291 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
292 See Steiker, supra note 61, at 106.
293 Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth Amendment,
and Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 207 (2009).
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views over deserved punishment that go in the opposite direction. This problem coun-
sels against attempts at close enforcement of the deserts limitation.
C. Further Discounts of Plea-Bargained Sentences
A third problem with widespread invalidation of undeserved sentences would arise
because of the predominance of plea bargaining in our criminal-justice systems.294 Most
criminal cases in both state and federal courts find resolution through guilty pleas,295 the
vast majority of which result from explicit or implicit bargaining.296 In many cases,
those bargained sentences are already discounted below what offenders deserve for
their crimes297 and are substantially less than what they would have received after con-
victions at trial.298 Although the risk of excessiveness arises mostly regarding post-trial
sentences, further downward pressure on plea-bargained sentences could result if strict
proportionality limitations were placed on post-trial sanctions.299 The consequence
could be the undermining of legitimate crime-prevention efforts.300
Critics already contend that plea bargaining extends undeserved leniency that
thwarts the public interest.301 The amount of sentencing reductions that occur through
bargaining is also often enormous.302 Some commentators have suggested that these
reductions may only reflect the uncertainty of conviction at trial, and thus, may be
294 By plea “bargaining,” I mean the creation by the judge or prosecutor, whether implicitly
or explicitly, of an expectation of leniency that is subsequently honored in return for a guilty plea.
“So long as defendants routinely expect to receive some form of sentencing consideration in
exchange for an admission of guilt, the essence of a system of bargain justice is present.” Thomas
W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice,” 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 509, 512 (1979).
295 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (noting that ninety-seven percent of
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions result from guilty pleas).
296 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1106
(1984) (“In the absence of concessions, most felony defendants do in fact demand a trial . . . .”).
297 See, e.g., Kenneth Kipnis, Plea Bargaining: A Critic’s Rejoinder, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
555, 558 (1979) (asserting that defendants who bargain “receive less than the punishment
they deserve”).
298 See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 49 (“The reality of sentencing differentials
is generally enough to deprive defendants of any real choice in plea bargaining.”).
299 See infra notes 302–07 and accompanying text.
300 See infra notes 308–10 and accompanying text.
301 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 5, at 660, 679 (contending that plea bargains “fail to ac-
complish the legitimate purposes of the criminal law” and thwart “the legitimate objectives of
the criminal sanction”); Gifford, supra note 298, at 97–98 (asserting that bargaining promotes
“unwarranted leniency in sentencing”); Kipnis, supra note 297, at 558 (asserting that defendants
who bargain receive less punishment than they “deserve”); Schulhofer, supra note 5, at 2009
(contending that bargaining undermines “the public interest in effective law enforcement and
adequate punishment of the guilty”).
302 See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 298, at 46–49.
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deserved.303 In this view, bargains merely reflect the “expected sentence before trial”
and are “the same” for those who accept the deal and those who choose a trial.304
Yet, this view is flawed because it describes the atypical rather than the norm. Prose-
cutors and judges commonly offer plea deals based not only on the uncertainty of
conviction but also on other factors, especially the adjudication costs avoided.305
Therefore, the substantial leniency extended often will have no connection with the
defendant’s deserts.306
By restricting post-trial sentences, where excessiveness most often arises, further
downward pressure could also operate on plea-bargained sentences. Uncertainty exists
over precisely how changes in post-trial maximums might affect the plea-bargaining
process. However, absent concessions, most felony defendants will go to trial.307 If post-
trial maximums decreased and prosecutors needed to offer the same reductions in either
absolute or proportional terms that they currently do to secure guilty pleas, the average
length of sentences in the plea-bargained cases would also fall.
Reductions in the length of sentences imposed in the plea-bargained cases could
plausibly impair legitimate crime prevention. Crime rates may not typically be sensitive
to small changes in sentencing.308 Nonetheless, significant changes could well affect de-
terrence efforts for many kinds of crimes.309 The idea that putative criminal offenders
respond somewhat rationally to changes in the price of crime has long been a mainstay
of criminal-justice theory.310 In this view, attempting to impose a deserts limitation on
303 Judge David Bazelon urged this view. See Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 276 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
304 Id.
305 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909, 1949 (1992) (“In the typical case, the gains from trade are straightforward—
savings in adjudication costs . . . .”); Comment, The Influence of the Defendant’s Plea on
Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L. J. 204, 219 (1957) (“Many judges expressed
the belief that a defendant pleading guilty should receive some reduction in the gravity of
sentence because of the role of guilty pleas in the efficient and economical administration
of criminal law.”).
306 The notion that the act of pleading guilty based on a deal by itself reduces the offender’s
deserts also makes no sense. See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 662–67 (rejecting the notion that
those who bargain have more remorse or are better prospects for rehabilitation).
307 Schulhofer, supra note 296, at 1106.
308 See Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as
Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1093–99 (2011) (explaining why deterrence effects
will often not work).
309 Although not without controversy, studies in the last decade have asserted, for example,
that the death penalty has a marginal deterrent effect over life imprisonment on the commission
of murder. See LINDA E. CARTER, ELLEN S. KREITZBERG & SCOTT W. HOWE, UNDERSTANDING
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 10–11 (3d ed. 2012).
310 See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: OF
PUBLIC WRONGS, 2169–70, *16–17 (William Carey Jones ed., 1916) (“[A]s punishments are
chiefly intended for the prevention of future crimes, it is but reasonable that . . . among crimes
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a tiny pool of post-trial sentences would subvert crime prevention by reducing the al-
ready discounted sentencing rates among the vast majority of cases that end with a bar-
gained guilty plea.
D. Costs to Supreme Court Influence
Committing to the deserts-limitation principle would also put the Court greatly at
odds with most citizens in pursuing justice for defendants over crime prevention. I con-
tend that most of us are sufficiently committed to the deserts limitation that we some-
times deny irrationally our willingness to depart from it when the price becomes high.
The “ideals” of a deserts limitation do not conform with what we perceive as our
“need[ ]” for a sense of safety.311 Most of us care about fairness for criminal defendants,
perhaps because we fear being criminal defendants or simply because we care about
justice.312 Yet, most of us also care about crime prevention.313 Indeed, I suggest that
most of us prefer to ignore the deserts limitation when we sense a serious risk to our
safety or the safety of others about whom we care. In light of this conflict in our own
thinking as citizens, we can hardly expect the Court to pursue the deserts limitation
as if there were no competing considerations.
The strongest demonstration that a majority of the citizenry is prepared to dispense
with individual justice for criminal defendants to promote other ends is the widespread
and large number of laws through which we already have abandoned the deserts limita-
tion. The citizenry has acquiesced to, supported, or even directly enacted onerous sen-
tencing laws that obviously pursue crime prevention at the expense of retributive limits;
“three-strikes” laws for repeat offenders are a good example.314 Between 1993 and
1995, twenty-four states and the federal government enacted these provisions by voter
initiatives or statutes.315 In California, based on a voter initiative that passed by a margin
of seventy-two to twenty-eight percent,316 citizens agreed that a person with two prior
“serious”317 felony convictions who commits even a minor third felony should receive
of an equal malignity, those [should be most harshly punished] which a man has the most fre-
quent and easy opportunities of committing, which cannot be so easily guarded against as others,
and which therefore the offender has the strongest inducement to commit . . . .”).
311 See Kronman, supra note 55, at 1577 (explaining that our ideals are our aspirational goals
and differ from our needs).
312 See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPER-
ATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 53–57 (2002) (pointing to empirical data indicating that
the public values behavior by police and court officials that is “perceived as procedurally fair”).
313 See THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS SENTENCING ATTITUDES SURVEY: A
REPORT ON THE FINDINGS 3–5 (July 2006), available at http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content
/microsites/csi/home/topics/~/media/microsites/files/csi/the%20ncsc%20sentencing%20attitudes
%20survey.ashx.
314 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
315 See id. at 15.
316 See id.
317 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (West 2011).
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“an indeterminate term of life imprisonment.”318 Because such laws can impose severe
penalties on even fairly low-culpability offenders, they represent an obvious effort to
“protect[ ] the public safety”319 rather than to honor retributive limits.320
The citizenry also has long accepted many other substantive criminal laws that aim
for crime prevention at the expense of honoring retributive limits. Honest mistakes re-
garding crucial facts can exculpate, but they usually must be mistakes that the “reason-
able” person would make, even if the defendant does not possess the capacity of the
reasonable person.321 The law permits claims of self-defense, but typically requires even
the least capable individuals, as a condition for acquittal, to have acted at the level of
a “reasonable” person in concluding that the risk of harm they faced was serious and
imminent.322 A “reasonableness” demand also exists in the doctrine allowing mitigation
of murder to manslaughter in cases of alleged provocation.323 These rules reveal that,
although we care about offender blameworthiness, we are often not willing to honor it
to the point of allowing dangerous persons to avoid conviction, blame, and punishment.
A variety of other criminal-law doctrines even more dramatically eschew retribu-
tive limits for utilitarian goals. For example, felony-murder doctrine combined with
vicarious-liability rules disallow claims that participants with minor roles in felonies
should not be held liable for murder, when accidental deaths are caused by their co-
felons.324 After the Hinckley acquittal,325 statutes in many jurisdictions narrowed,
neutered, or eviscerated the insanity defense, holding many defendants with severe
mental defects fully responsible despite their reduced culpability.326 Likewise, as we
318 Id. In 2012, Californians finally voted to at least modify the law, “ending a practice in
which prosecutors could seek 25-years-to-life sentences for defendants even if their latest
offense—their third strike—was neither serious nor violent.” Marisa Lagos & Ellen Huet, ‘Three
Strikes’ Law Changes Approved by Wide Margin, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2012, at A14.
319 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15.
320 Some citizens might well assert that three-strike felons “deserve” life imprisonment. How-
ever, the Supreme Court made no pretense of suggesting that such a view was plausible when
it upheld the law, conceding that the obvious rationale for the law was “incapacitating and deter-
ring repeat offenders.” Id. at 14.
321 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simcock, 575 N.E.2d 1137, 1141 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991)
(“[A]n honest and reasonable mistake of fact may be a defense . . . .”).
322 See, e.g., State v. Simon, 646 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Kan. 1982).
323 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
324 See DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 511–12.
325 See Jonathan Sallet, After Hinckley: The Insanity Defense Reexamined, 94 YALE L.J. 1545,
1545, 1547–52 (1985); Fred Barbash, Hinckley Verdict Leads ABA to Ask Narrowing of Insanity
Defense, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1983, at A3.
326 Four states abolished the insanity defense. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (West,
Westlaw through 2013), amended by MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-101 (West, Westlaw through
Mar. 22, 2013), amended by 2013 Mont. Laws 209; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (West,
Westlaw through 2012 Fourth Special Sess.); H.B. 2339, 84th Leg., 2011 Reg. Sess. (Kan.
2011) (repealing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220). Other jurisdictions retained the defense, but
mandated the restrictive M’Naughton formulation and imposed the burden of proof on the
defendant. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (2006).
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have seen, mistake-of-law doctrine generally renders ignorance of the law irrelevant
as a defense,327 regardless of whether the accused acted reasonably.328 The widespread
existence of these laws reveal our willingness to ignore justice for defendants in support
of rules that we hope will help with crime prevention.
Some criminal prohibitions and punishments also exist largely if not entirely to
deter other crimes. A good example is the federal statute criminalizing the willful fail-
ure to report when one is transporting more than $10,000 in cash out of the country.329
The maximum possible penalties include up to five years in prison and up to $250,000
in fines,330 along with the forfeiture of at least some of the transported money.331 The
rationale is to deter crimes such as tax evasion, drug trafficking, and other organized
crime ventures that thrive on international money-laundering.332 Transporting even
large amounts of currency out of the country is permissible as long as the transporter
reports the action.333 At the same time, a willful transporter who fails to report will fall
within the statute even if he is otherwise law-abiding.334 He will be convicted and pun-
ished although the funds that he carries are not connected to another crime and he has
no aim to engage in other illicit activity. The statute permits his lack of serious blame-
worthiness to be ignored in the interest of crime deterrence.
The view that the citizenry supports these laws is compelling. Virtually all of them
are enforced with enough regularity that the public cannot be unaware of them. Citizens
may tend to view them as imposing deserved punishment for the most part.335 Nonethe-
less, these laws so obviously violate retributive limits that the denial by the citizenry of
their unjustness only underscores our commitment to the desert limitation. We do not
want to admit a willingness to abandon the deserts limitation because the principle helps
“define the kind of people we would like to be.”336
Insofar as we accept the deserts limitation as an aspiration, the Court cannot de-
mand obedience across the board to an ideal that we have so long and so often ignored.
In constructing an open-ended provision like the prohibition on “cruel and unusual
327 See supra notes 260–62 and accompanying text.
328 See generally, e.g., United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
329 See 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a) (2006). Proponents of criminal laws that require registration of
firearms, licensing of buyers, and very restrictive eligibility criteria for firearm purchases have
also urged crime prevention rather than retribution as the primary justification. See, e.g., D. W.
Webster et al., Relationship Between Licensing, Registration, and Other Gun Sales Laws and the
Source State of Crime Guns, 7 INJ. PREVENTION 184, 184, 189 (2001), available at http://
injuryprevention.bmj.com/content/7/3/184.full.pdf+html?sid=eb639a61-c5c0-41a1-b0ea-6dee
2b70fa22 (finding that such laws “can affect the availability of guns to criminals”).
330 See 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2006).
331 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 326 (1998).
332 See id. at 351 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
333 See id. at 337.
334 See id. at 337–38.
335 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 85, at 1116.
336 Kronman, supra note 55, at 1577.
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punishments,”337 we may believe that the role of the Court is to attempt to discern and
implement the deeper values of our society.338 Yet the Court preserves its power as “the
pronouncer and guardian of [our enduring] values”339 by first recognizing that the cen-
tral function of the nonjudicial branches is to satisfy not our aspirations, but our sense
of existing need, and those needs and aspirations are often incongruent.340 The Court
must also recognize that its “expansive powers to define our moral course [is] matched
only by its powerlessness to impose that course in the face of popular dissent.”341 There
are plenty of examples, such as “school prayer or desegregation,”342 to underscore that
when the Justices make controversial decisions, “they cannot take public compliance
for granted.”343 When we have failed our aspirations spectacularly, the Court cannot,
except in small steps, move us to obey.344
In enforcing Eighth Amendment values, the Court can only move forward with
“prudence,”345 reminding us in limited measure of our aspirations—including the de-
serts limitation—and avoiding as much as possible pronouncements that subvert them.
Perhaps the Court has muddled its work in the proportionality context, too often ob-
scuring, rather than highlighting, the deserts limitation even as it has granted propor-
tionality relief.346 Nonetheless, we can safely say that the desert limitation is so little
enforced by the Justices not because the citizenry fails to see it as the very definition
of fairness, but in part because the Court endangers its own institutional standing
by embracing a principle that conflicts with so many laws and practices that find
popular support.
CONCLUSION
The Eighth Amendment proportionality doctrine underscores that the Supreme
Court sometimes cannot do much to move us to live up to our constitutional ideals.
A simple principle of justice defines the proportionality aspiration—the deserts limi-
tation—which holds that no criminal defendant should be punished more than he de-
serves. This principle reflects societal notions about the core meaning of fair treatment
337 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
338 See Fallon, supra note 154, at 1543.
339 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24 (2d ed. 1962).
340 See Kronman, supra note 55, at 1577.
341 Id. at 1581.
342 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19 (1990).
343 Id.
344 This conclusion acknowledges that, within fairly broad limits, American citizens believe
in obeying Supreme Court decisions even with which they disagree. See Tom R. Tyler, A
Deference-Based Perspective on Duty: Empowering Government to Define Duties to Oneself
and to Others, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES: EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
AND NORMATIVE COMMENTARIES 137, 150–52 (Norman J. Finkel & Fathali M. Moghaddam
eds., 2005).
345 See Kronman, supra note 55, at 1571.
346 See supra Part II.
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of criminal defendants by the state,347 and it alone among penological theories can ex-
plain the decisions in which the Court has granted proportionality protection.348 Yet,
many of our criminal laws and sentencing practices violate the deserts limitation, and
the Court has made no effort to overturn most of them. When the Court has granted pro-
portionality protection, it has also generally obscured the deserts limitation as the expla-
nation. Instead, the Justices have asserted—usually unconvincingly—that a societal
consensus has arisen against the punishment and that the punishment inadequately
serves any penological function, including deterrence or incapacitation.349 The Court’s
ambivalence about enforcing—or even emphasizing—the deserts limitation mirrors
our societal struggle with a moral principle that we know is right, but that out of self-
interest we often ignore.
I have urged that the Court’s unwillingness to enforce the deserts limitation clearly
and consistently finds justification in four practical factors that the Justices cannot dis-
regard. The first involves the complexity of any effort by the Justices to determine and
articulate a comprehensive code of deserts limitations. The second concerns the effect
of a grant of proportionality relief in potentially thwarting the evolution of legitimate
social views about deserts that favor increased punishment. The third arises from the
downward pressure that close regulation of criminal sentences by the Court could have
on the already reduced punishments imposed through plea bargaining. The fourth con-
cerns the danger posed to the Court’s institutional standing when it tries to demand ad-
herence to an ideal that regularly has been ignored by the citizenry based on perceptions
of existing needs. Although the deserts limitation powerfully defines our aspiration for
justice for criminal defendants, these four pragmatic factors weigh heavily against any
effort by the Court to fully enforce it.
Given the practical arguments against endorsing the deserts limitation, should the
Court simply have avoided constructing the Eighth Amendment to forbid excessive
punishments beyond those deemed inherently inhumane? Justice Holmes favored that
approach; he joined the dissent in Weems, which concluded that there was “no ground
whatever” to support “the interpretation now given to the cruel and unusual punishment
clause.”350 Holmes’s views on the question had been largely foretold by his commentary
in The Common Law351 almost thirty years earlier. In the lecture on crimes, he had em-
phatically rejected the view that government was restricted in punishing criminals only
to the limit of their deserts.352 He asserted that the criminal law frequently “exceeds the
limits of retribution, and subordinates consideration of the individual to that of the pub-
lic well-being,”353 and he discussed various criminal law doctrines that “cannot be
347 See supra notes 84–91 and accompanying text.
348 For a discussion of these decisions, see supra Part I.B.
349 See supra Part II.
350 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 409 (1910) (White, J., dissenting).
351 See generally HOLMES, supra note 81.
352 See id. at 46–48.
353 Id. at 47.
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satisfactorily explained on any other ground.”354 He concluded that this was “perfectly
proper,”355 because “[n]o society has ever admitted that it could not sacrifice individual
welfare to its own existence.”356 In this view, the Eighth Amendment could not possibly
prohibit the state from punishing criminals more than they deserve. Yet, for the Court
to walk away entirely from the deserts limitation would be to ignore an ideal that is
central to society’s notions of justice,357 and, in that sense, plausible as an Eighth
Amendment aspiration.
Could the Court confine proportionality protections to a small category of only the
most serious punishments? By clearly articulating and enforcing the deserts limitation
in a restricted context, perhaps the Court could serve as “shaper and prophet,”358 encour-
aging us voluntarily to pursue that ideal throughout the criminal law. In the modern era,
until recently, the Court had restricted proportionality protections almost entirely to the
death-penalty arena, although, even in that area, without much clarity.359 Across the rest
of criminal law, the Court had rendered proportionality doctrine almost a dead letter.360
Of course, the Court recently ignored its earlier claim that “death is [ ] different [from
all sentences of incarceration]”361 by concluding that juvenile offenders warrant major
proportionality protection from sentences of life imprisonment without parole.362 The
decision to abandon this line of separation suggests that the deserts limitation is too cen-
tral to our notions of justice to remain cabined in a small corner of criminal law. Yet,
the Court also remains in a struggle over how to give principle to proportionality doc-
trine and also to confine it. For the Court to say that the proportionality notion imple-
ments the deserts limitation and that this ideal should apply across the whole landscape
of criminal law would be to embrace the unenforceable.
In the end, we should not fault the Court for its failure to articulate a clear aspiration
to justify and guide its proportionality doctrine. In this area, there is no good way for
the Justices to mediate between the social ideal—the deserts limitation—and the prac-
tical problems that would arise from endorsing it. Proportionality doctrine must remain
anemic compared to its theoretical potential, and it must remain unprincipled. Its ad hoc
nature only reflects the conflict within us, the collective citizenry. We believe in the de-
serts limitation as an ideal that helps define the kind of people we would like to be. Yet,
we are much more resistant to following that ideal when there is a perceived price to
pay than we would like to portray ourselves. And we cannot always expect the Court
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